This project aims to contribute to the importance of Robert Grosseteste in the history of philosophy, and to establish groundwork for further development in these two areas of philosophy, to contribute to contemporary philosophy. Robert Grosseteste was the first chancellor of Oxford University and Bishop of Lincoln 1235-53. These two areas of Grosseteste's philosophy have not been thoroughly explored, nor their importance established. The book focuses on two important areas in the philosophy of Robert Grosseteste at the beginning of the thirteenth century: Philosophy of Intellect and Philosophy of Vision. Then it will revisit some of the same texts to address the more difficult question of distinction ex parte rei. After giving a brief introduction to Grosseteste's aspectus/affectus distinction, this paper will examine key passages from his Letter 1, his De Libero Arbitrio, and his Hexaëmeron to show that Grosseteste tacitly but knowingly rejected the substance/accident composition of the soul and its powers. Are the soul's powers identical with the simple substance of the soul, or are they accidents of it? When it is granted that the powers are identical with the substance of the soul, for Robert Grosseteste, the second question is whether any distinction ex parte rei may still be applicable to the soul and its powers in general, and to aspectus and affectus in particular. The first question is that of substance/accident composition. This paper proposes to investigate two important questions pertaining to Grosseteste's metaphysics of the soul. The answer to this question is inextricable from the broader question of the relationship of the soul to its powers. One major question that must be answered is how Grosseteste conceived of aspectus and affectus on the level of being. Although Grosseteste scholars have long recognized the importance of his aspectus/affectus distinction, it has until now received little sustained attention. By distinguishing the aspectus from the affectus and then describing their relationship, Grosseteste made some of his most profound observations about the soul. Aspectus principally denotes reason, and affectus refers to the will and emotions. " desire " or " affection ") to name the cognitive and appetitive powers of the rational soul. Throughout at least four decades of his scholarly career, Grosseteste frequently used the terms aspectus (lit. Robert Grosseteste (c.1168/1170-1253) is an important figure in the history of science, philosophy, and theology.
#Affectus in full version#
In modern word-formation sometimes ad- and ab- are regarded as opposites, but this was not in classical Latin.This is the full version of a paper I presented at the 2017 Patristic, Medieval, and Renaissance Studies Conference at Villanova University.
The process went further in England than in France (where the vernacular sometimes resisted the pedantic), resulting in English adjourn, advance, address, advertisement (Modern French ajourner, avancer, adresser, avertissement). Over-correction at the end of the Middle Ages in French and then English "restored" the -d- or a doubled consonant to some words that never had it ( accursed, afford). In many cases pronunciation followed the shift. in words it had picked up from Old French. In Old French, reduced to a- in all cases (an evolution already underway in Merovingian Latin), but French refashioned its written forms on the Latin model in 14c., and English did likewise 15c. Simplified to a- before sc-, sp- and st- modified to ac- before many consonants and then re-spelled af-, ag-, al-, etc., in conformity with the following consonant (as in affection, aggression). Word-forming element expressing direction toward or in addition to, from Latin ad "to, toward" in space or time "with regard to, in relation to," as a prefix, sometimes merely emphatic, from PIE root *ad- "to, near, at."
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